How to Track Chinese Military Flights: A Beginner's Guide to Open Source Intelligence

By Taiwan Strait Tracker Intelligence Team | February 2026

You do not need a classified security clearance to monitor the People's Liberation Army. You just need an internet connection and the right methodology.

Open source intelligence (OSINT) has completely democratised geopolitical forecasting. Ten years ago, tracking a military build up required satellite access and government resources. Today, our intelligence team relies heavily on publicly available data to verify rhetorical threats against physical troop movements. Here is exactly how we monitor Chinese military flights around Taiwan.

The Unfiltered Radar: ADS-B Exchange

Most commercial flight trackers, such as Flightradar24, actively filter out military aircraft to comply with government requests. OSINT analysts bypass this by using ADS-B Exchange.

Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) is a technology where aircraft broadcast their GPS position, altitude, and speed. ADS-B Exchange is a community driven network of global receivers that refuses to filter or block any data. When a PLA Shaanxi Y-8 anti-submarine warfare aircraft leaves the Chinese coast and leaves its transponder on, it appears right here.

• How to use it: Users can filter the global map specifically for military hex codes.
• The limitation: Military pilots turn their transponders off during tactical manoeuvres. We only see them when they want to be seen, making this a tool for tracking diplomatic signalling rather than stealth operations.

Official Telemetry: Taiwan Ministry of National Defence

When the transponders go dark, we rely on the primary target radar data published directly by the Taiwanese government. The Taiwan Ministry of National Defence (MND) is highly transparent about airspace incursions.

Every morning at 6:00 AM local time, the MND releases a daily briefing detailing the exact number of PLA aircraft and People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) vessels operating around the island over the previous 24 hours. They provide detailed flight path maps that allow us to categorise the severity of the incursion.

Decoding the Flight Paths

A count of "30 aircraft" means very little without spatial context. We analyse the exact flight trajectories to determine the risk level.

• The South West ADIZ: This is the most common zone for PLA flights. It sits between Taiwan and the Pratas Islands. Flights here are routine and generate a low risk score in our algorithm.
• Crossing the Median Line: The median line is the unofficial maritime border running down the centre of the Taiwan Strait. Prior to 2022, PLA crossings were rare. Now, they are a daily occurrence. We track the volume of these crossings to gauge Beijing's immediate frustration level.
• Encirclement Flights: When PLA drones or bombers fly entirely around the eastern coast of Taiwan, it simulates an access denial operation aimed at the United States Navy. This specifically triggers our "Elevated" risk metrics.

Tracking the planes is only step one. As we outlined in our methodology, we pair this aviation data with semiconductor market volatility. A spike in median line crossings is just noise. A spike in median line crossings combined with a massive TSMC stock sell off is a signal. That is the difference between data collection and intelligence analysis.

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